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ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS  
APPLY

TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
FM USLD PEKING

T O P S E C R E T / SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

25X1

PEKING 101 JANUARY 17, 1975  
TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
FROM: GEORGE BUSH  
SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON SENATOR MANSFIELD'S REPORT TO THE  
PRESIDENT

1. ATTACHED ARE SOME COMMENTS ON SENATOR MANSFIELD'S REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BASED ON THE SUMMARY WHICH YOU SENT ME VIA THIS CHANNEL. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR HOLDING THEM FOR ME FOR POSSIBLE USE IN DISCUSSIONS DURING MY CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON. IF YOU WISH, PLEASE FEEL FREE TO SHOW THEM ON A CLOSE-HOLD BASIS TO THOSE IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND STATE DEPARTMENT WHO MIGHT FIND THEM OF INTEREST. I WOULD NOT WANT WIDE DISTRIBUTION.

SENATOR MANSFIELD CLEARLY CAME AWAY FROM CHINA WITH A VERY OPTIMISTIC IMPRESSION OF HOW CHINA STANDS ECONOMICALLY, POLITICALLY AND IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. OUR OWN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION WOULD NOT BE QUITE SO OPTIMISTIC. WHILE CHINA HAS DONE WELL ECONOMICALLY IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, INDUSTRY LAGGED IN 1974 (PARTLY DUE TO POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES); AREAS OF TENSION, IF NOT OUTRIGHT POLITICAL DISSENT, APPEARED (PROBLEMS WITH "DOWN TO THE COUNTRYSIDE" YOUTH, WORKERS' DESIRE FOR HIGHER WAGES, ETC.) AND THERE WERE EVIDENT STRAINS WITHIN THE TOP LEADERSHIP AND BETWEEN THE LEADERSHIP AND THE PLA; IN FOREIGN POLICY CHINA FOUND ITSELF A BYSTANDER IN WORLD AFFAIRS RATHER THAN A MAJOR PROTAGONIST DESPITE ITS IDENTIFICATION WITH THE "THIRD WORLD." AND REMAINED ON THE DEFENSIVE WITH RESPECT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

HOWEVER, THIS SITUATION DOES NOT NECESSARILY CONFLICT WITH SENATOR MANSFIELD'S BELIEF THAT WE SHOULD MOVE FASTER ON

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US-PRC NORMALIZATION. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE CHINESE LEADERS WOULD, INDEED, AS THE SENATOR SUGGESTS, LIKE TO SHOW THE CHINESE PEOPLE MORE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARD NORMALIZATION AS A MEANS OF HELPING TO JUSTIFY THE "CORRECTNESS" OF THEIR LEADERSHIP. THIS SHOULD NOT MEAN THAT WE MUST ADHERE COMPLETELY TO THE JAPANESE FORMULA, THOUGH. THE CHINESE CHARACTERISTICALLY HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT EVERYTHING IS UP TO US, BUT WE SHOULD MAKE SOME EFFORT TO IMPRESS UPON THEM THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR OWN POLITICAL SITUATION, EVEN THOUGH THE JAPANESE FORMULA MIGHT BE THE BASIC APPROACH TO BE FOLLOWED.

PERHAPS A GREATER SENSE OF MOMENTUM IN US-PRC NORMALIZATION WOULD BE DESIRABLE. THIS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED BY MOVING FORWARD MORE VIGOROUSLY ON THE CLAIMS/ASSETS ISSUE (EVEN IF THE CHINESE REGARD IT AS A "MINOR PROBLEM") TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH ON OUR SIDE IN DEALING WITH ISSUES SUCH AS THOSE WHICH ARE INVOLVED IN US-PRC RELATIONS. MORE HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT IN BOTH WASHINGTON AND PEKING WOULD BE DESIRABLE SO AS TO GET AWAY FROM THE CONCEPT THAT ONLY THE SECRETARY'S VISITS TO PEKING CAN ADVANCE US-PRC RELATIONS. ONE THING WE WOULD NEED TO DISCUSS WOULD BE WORKING OUT SOME FORMULA WHEREBY, IN ARRANGING FOR NORMALIZATION, THE US WOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE SIMPLY ABANDONING TAIWAN TO ITS FATE. SOME STATEMENT, ALBEIT OBLIQUE, FROM PEKING ON NOT USING FORCE AGAINST THE ISLAND WOULD BE DESIRED (EVEN THOUGH THE CHINESE SAY THEY CANNOT GIVE US ONE).

IN ADDITION, WE MIGHT CONSIDER MOVING MORE RAPIDLY WITH RESPECT TO US FORCE LEVELS ON TAIWAN. FOR EXAMPLE, BOTH IDC AND MAAG ARE SACRED COWS WHICH HAVE LONG SINCE OUTLIVED THEIR REASON FOR BEING. WE MIGHT CONSIDER CLOSING THEM DOWN SOON, EVEN AT THE EXPENSE OF CAUSING SOME DISMAY IN TAIWAN, INASMUCH AS THEY WILL BE CLOSED DOWN EVENTUALLY ANYWAY. TAIWAN MIGHT JUST AS WELL GET USED TO THE IDEA.

THE SENATOR IS PROBABLY LETTING HIS OWN PRECONCEPTIONS SHOW THROUGH ABOUT THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF US FORCES IN KOREA AND THE US ROLE IN CAMBODIA. REGARDING KOREA, THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN QUITE EQUIVOCAL IN DISCUSSING ANY TIME SPAN FOR THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THEY WANT TO SEE A RAPID SHIFT IN KOREAN POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON JAPAN. REGARDING CAMBODIA, THERE IS NO REASON WHY THE CHINESE SHOULD IMPLY HAVE EVERYTHING THEIR WAY AND WE SHOULD PULL OUT, AND INDEED A US PULLOUT MIGHT WELL AND PROBABLY WOULD HAVE A DELETERIOUS EFFECT ON US RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN ASIA, NOTABLY THAILAND AND JAPAN. REGARDING JAPAN, FOR INSTANCE, WE COULD HARDLY EXPECT THE JAPANESE TO THINK VERY HIGHLY OF OUR MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY IF IN ANOTHER PART OF THE FOREST WE SIMPLY WALKED OUT ON AN ALLY. PERHAPS THERE WOULD BE ONLY A QUEST

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OF TIME REFORUSNE ARE ASKED OUT OF JAPAN, WHICH WOULD HAVE VERY GRAVE IMPLICATIONS INDEED FOR OUR ENTIRE POLICY IN THE PACIFIC.

FINALLY, A MEANS WOULD BE WORKED OUT FOR SENIOR CHINESE OFFICIALS TO VISIT THE US TO ENGAGE IN SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH APPROPRIATE US OFFICIALS. SO FAR, DESPITE CHIAO KUAN-HUA'S YEARLY VISITS TO THE UNGA AND TENG HSIAO-PING'S TRIP TO NEW YORK FOR THE SPECIAL UN SESSION IN APRIL 1974, THE WORLD HAS THE IMPRESSION THAT IT IS THE US WHICH HAS DONE ALL THE TRAVELLING IN ORDER TO TALK TO THE CHINESE. THIS IS AN UNDESIRABLE IMPRESSION, AND INDEED THE FACTS ARE SUCH AS NOT TO ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT. IF SENIOR CHINESE OFFICIALS CANNOT VISIT WASHINGTON--AND CHIAO KUAN-HUA APPEARS TO HAVE RULED THIS OUT--THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE NO GOOD REASON WHY THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK WOULD NOT PROVIDE A CONVENIENT VENUE. A CHECK OF UPCOMING INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES REVEALS THAT SEVERAL HIGH-LEVEL ECOSOC MEETINGS WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE MAY 1975 TO WHICH THE CHINESE MIGHT WELL SEND SENIOR PERSONNEL TO REPRESENT THE PRC. OR, ALTERNATIVELY, THE CHINESE COULD SIMPLY SEND SOME SENIOR PERSONAGE TO NEW YORK FOR THE OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE OF TALKING OVER UN MATTERS WITH THE PRC DELEGATION. IF CHIAO KUAN-HUA WOULD PREFER TO INVOLVE HIMSELF PERSONALLY, SOMEONE WITH THE STATURE OF VICE FOREIGN MINISTER YU CHAN COMES TO MIND. OF COURSE, IF THE CHINESE SHOULD SEND SOMEONE OF THIS LEVEL TO NEW YORK, WE WOULD WANT TO PUBLICIZE ANY CONTACTS WITH US OFFICIALS AND CONSIDER REFERRING TO WHAT WAS SAID IN THIS RESPECT IN SECRETARY KISSINGER'S JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF NOVEMBER 1973 ABOUT CONTACTS BETWEEN OFFICIALS AT "AUTHORITATIVE LEVELS."

2. BEST REGARDS.

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